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Abstract
Certain classes of social and economic networks display a set of fundamen-
tally similar characteristics: individuals beneﬁt from being in groups, and the
groups are internally organized in a hierarchical fashion where beneﬁt is allo-
cated unequally. To better understand how these networks evolve and maintain
themselves, we developed a model that grows hierarchical networks through the
local actions of agents who can both solicit others to join their group and defect
to start their own independent organization. Group beneﬁt is conceptualized
as synergy, which increases more rapidly than the sum of the individual talent
of group members. Synergy is allocated back to members within the hierar-
chy through a nonlinear payback function such that the higher an individual is
within the hierarchy, the greater their payback. Parametric simulations where
we consider the inﬂuence of the payback function and population size indicate
that cluster size transitions from the size of the entire population where the
maximum system synergy is obtained to smaller and smaller values as payback
becomes increasingly inequitable and population size becomes large. For such
sub-maximal situations, we ﬁnd cluster size and total system synergy to ﬂuctu-
ate with well deﬁned mean values that suggests the existence of a stochastically
stable, asymptotic attractor.
1 Introduction
Groups of people, animals, and other entities form for many reasons, such as to
be more productive (in the case of humans that collaborate) and to increase the
∗Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin
Company for the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration
under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
1likelihood of individual survival (in the case of animals that herd). One can think of
similar beneﬁts of creating tribes, trade unions, extended families, special interest
groups, political action committees, and political parties. Over longer time scales,
local communities form so as to expand, adapt and prosper; and federations of
nations form to create international stability. In economics, the forces by which
ﬁrms are formed are often discussed through the work of Coase[1], who postulated
that economic ﬁrms composed of employees fundamentally cut the costs of people
exchanging services and information — clustering individuals generates returns that
are greater than the sum of their parts. Broadly, these varied grouping beneﬁts are
forms of synergy.1
An important factor inﬂuencing these groups is the returns that each group
member receives. In natural and social systems, not every member receives the
same portion of the overall “pie.” Heads of corporations, for example, often receive
orders of magnitude more than lower level employees. Leaders of political parties
hold inordinate powers generated by the work of the party. Animals at the physical
center of a herd are more protected than those at the edges. Since most groups
are composed of overall group leaders, sub-group leaders, and base-level members,
they resemble hierarchical networks, where leaders have sub-group- or group-wide
powers, and receive above-average returns. If the returns for a member are not
suﬃcient, the member leaves the group, either alone or with other group members
that defer to the leaver in some way (e.g., an entire department of technology stock
traders). Very large groups grow and adjust naturally through the addition and
defection of members.
But how do these groups fundamentally form? How is the structure of a group,
its speed of formation, and its stability aﬀected by the structure of paybacks to
its group members? Are some groups inherently unstable? Are there natural con-
straints that prevent the group from reaching the size that maximizes global beneﬁt?
To better understand how groups or networks of individuals form and evolve, we
construct a recurrent-game model of agents that form networks, where the returns
created by the group are greater than the sum of the individuals’ returns. Each
group beneﬁts from formation, and each returns the beneﬁts to its members using a
hierarchical payback scheme in which those higher in the organizational structure re-
ceive returns generally higher than those lower in the structure. Simulations based
on diﬀerent returns and payback schemes indicate that while in many situations
members form stable single clusters, in some situations there is continual, dramatic
ﬂuctuations in these hierarchical structures and, most importantly, in total system
synergy. Because our underling process is Markovian, the ﬂuctuating states sug-
gest stochastic equilibria, in which cluster structures oscillate stochastically within
a reduced set of potential system states. Regardless, the resulting group structures
1E.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Fourth Edition Copyright
2000 by Houghton Miﬄin Company) applies: “(1) The interaction of two or more agents or forces so
that their combined eﬀect is greater than the sum of their individual eﬀects; (2) Cooperative inter-
action among groups, especially among the acquired subsidiaries or merged parts of a corporation,
that creates an enhanced combined eﬀect.”
2Figure 1: Hierarchical Cluster of Agents
in both single-cluster and multiple-cluster cases are a clear function of the payback
structure.
The framework we have chosen is, by design, simple. While there are many
extensions to this model that can explore more complex group returns (based spe-
ciﬁc physical network structures), learning routines (e.g., reinforcement, best reply),
and the eﬀects of local perturbations in group returns and the distribution of pay-
backs, our main ﬁnding is that, even with ﬁxed relationships and parameters, group
evolution can be quite complex.
Section 2 details our simple network model, including the calculation of group
returns, the payback function that determines what fraction each member receives
of the group’s returns, and the rules for formation and defection; it concludes with a
set of parameters that deﬁne the recurrent game. Section 3 describes the objectives
and results of parametric simulations. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Network Model
2.1 Energy and Synergy
The network is composed of N agents. Each agent has a constant energy level en,
and seeks to gain synergy from interacting with other agents. More energy is better
than less: agent i can always achieve its own personal energy level, but it can also
join a group or cluster of other agents and achieve additional synergy. Figure 1
illustrates an example of this hierarchical clustering of agents; agents 4 and 5 report
to 2, who along with 3 reports to 1. Denoting the cluster of agents that is headed
by agent i as Ci, the energy level of Ci is deﬁned as
Ei = (
X
n∈Ci
en)ρ, (1)
where ρ is the measure of agent interactions, or synergy. The synergy of a cluster of
agents, Si, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the energy level of the cluster when
together and the sum of agents’ individual energies:
Si = (
X
n∈Ci
en)ρ − (
X
n∈Ci
eρ
n). (2)
3When ρ > 1, cluster synergy is positive; the energy created together is greater than
the sum of the individual energies. When ρ < 1, cluster synergy is negative; each
agent is worse oﬀ in a cluster than being by itself.
The synergy that is returned to each agent is a function of its location in the
cluster. If agent j belongs to cluster Ci, the synergy that agent j receives, ei
j, is a
fraction πi
j of the total synergy level of cluster:
ei
j = πi
jSi. (3)
One can imagine a range of hierarchial pay structures that distribute the total
synergy of a cluster back to its members: some structures could give an equal amount
to each member while others gave more to those at the top of the “organization.”
To model this distribution we use the following functional form for πi
j: deﬁning the
weighted contribution of agent j to cluster i to be the sum of its energy and all
energies below it, raised to a power,
ai
j = (
X
n∈Ci
en)γ, (4)
agent j’s payback from the cluster’s synergy is then the fraction
πi
j =
ai
j X
n∈Ci
ai
n
. (5)
The exponent γ is our measure of the asymmetry of paybacks. When γ = 0, each
member gets an equal share of the cluster’s synergy; as γ increases above 0 higher
fractions of total cluster synergy go to those in the upper parts of the hierarchy.
Still, when ρ > 1, an agent will always prefer to be in a cluster than alone, since the
synergy of a cluster of one agent is zero.2
2.2 The N-Person Recurrent Game
Each time period, an agent is selected at random and given two tasks. First, using
equations (1) through (5), the agent computes how its payoﬀ would change if it
and those agents that report to it defected from their current network. If this
predicted payoﬀ is greater than what the selected agent is currently receiving, the
agent and those underneath it defect to form their own new cluster, keeping the
existing hierarchy.
Second, the agent attempts to add agents to its cluster, by randomly selecting
another agent that is not in its cluster and oﬀering it a payback equal to what the
potential member will exactly receive this time period if it and its underlings join
2The returns for a one-agent cluster headed by agent i are
e
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a
i
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i
e
ρ
i − e
ρ
i = e
ρ
i − e
ρ
i = 0. (6)
4Table 1. Payoﬀs for Defection Game
Defect a
Do not defect 0
Table 2. Payoﬀs for Hiring Game
Accept oﬀer Decline oﬀer
Make oﬀer a,b 0,0
Do not make oﬀer 0,0 0,0
(the underlings have no say in this process). If the soliciting and solicited agents
determine that they will each receive larger individual paybacks by joining, the
solicited agent and its underlings defect from its current cluster and join the new
cluster, reporting to the soliciting agent.
While our sets of agent mechanics and decision rules are relatively simple, we
construct our environment in the context of existing frameworks so that, in the
future, we are prepared for natural extensions such as modeling learning and other
adaptive processes. Following Young[2], each agent i ∈ N has a pure strategy space
Xi and utility function ui that maps each N-tuple of strategies {x1,x2,...,xN} to
a payoﬀ function ui(x). Each agent is involved in two sequential games, each with
separate strategy spaces. The ﬁrst strategy is to consider defection and the second
to consider adding a new member (and any underlings) that will report to it. The
ﬁrst strategy is a single-person game, that is, the agent plays it against himself,
where utility ui(x) is measured by current period payoﬀ (Table 1). 3
The value a is the return the agent will get above what it is currently receiving.
This return are dynamic, i.e., it changes over time. If a > 0, the agent defects,
otherwise it stays put. The second payoﬀ function is for the two-person hiring game,
where the hiring agent meets and plays against the sampled potential hiree (Table
2). Again, each agent’s utility u(x) is the current-period payoﬀ of each strategy).
In this second case, “Make oﬀer” and “Accept oﬀer” are the dominate strategy if
a > 0 and b > 0, otherwise there will be no expansion of the oﬀering agent’s cluster.
Since each time period a new pair of agents from the population of N inter-
acts, the game is an N-person recurrent game.4 Deﬁning the set Oi as the set
of agents (i.e., opponents) eligible to play the game with agent i, the elements
{Xi,ui,Oi}1≤i≤N completely deﬁne the N-person recurrent game. Our recurrent
game is a discrete-time Markov process: ﬁrst, at time t, past states of the game
3Analytically, we could alternatively combine these two strategy spaces, where the defect-
ing/oﬀering agent has four strategies: Defect & Make oﬀer, Do not defect & Make oﬀer, etc.
For clarity of exposition, we keep them separate.
4Recurrent games are diﬀerent from repeated games in that diﬀerent pairs of agents interact each
time step.
5(e.g., t − 1) have no inﬂuence on future states (t + 1). Second, for any pair of
states {z,z0} in system state space Z, the transition probability Pz,z0 = Pz,z0(t) is
independent of t. Third, the state space is ﬁnite.5
2.3 System States and System Stability
Since all of our agents are equal in energy en, the more important set of states
to observe is the number, and to a lesser degree the structure, of clusters in the
overall system. Some systems of agents will follow any number of evolutionary
paths to a single cluster, i.e., the process to a single cluster is ergodic. Other
systems will eventually oscillate between 1, 2, and 3 clusters of varying sizes, but
may be asymptotically stable, that is, the system of clusters oscillates around and
tends toward a particular number of clusters. Stability is generally a function of the
relationship between N, ρ, and γ.
3 Parametric Simulations
To formally investigate the relationship between N, ρ, and γ, an initial series of
simulations where conducted, using a RePast simulation environment,6 where N =
{6,8,10,12,...,50}, ρ = {1.1,1.3,1.5}, and γ = {0.0,0.25,0.50,...,2.0}. Based on
the results from these, additional simulations were conducted to investigate speciﬁc
sub-areas within this space. Each simulation was run for a maximum of (50 × N)
steps, but was stopped if the system had reached a stable conﬁguration as deﬁned
by no change within the past (10 × N) steps. For those simulations where a stable,
unchanging conﬁguration was not reached, summary statistics such as mean and
standard deviation were calculated for S and C after an initial transient period of
(5 × N) steps.
3.1 Cluster Structure and Evolution
The payback exponent γ aﬀects the returns that members of a cluster receive and
therefore the structures of clusters. When γ = 0, each member receives an equal
share of the pie, and there is never suﬃcient incentive to defect (the new cluster’s
per-member returns will be smaller, since the cluster is smaller). Figure 2 illustrates
a single cluster that resulted from N = 100,ρ = 1.1,γ = 0.0.
When γ is larger than 0, agents within clusters begin to have suﬃcient incentives
to defect, resulting in diﬀerent hierarchical structures. For example, Figure 3 shows
a single cluster that resulted from N = 100,ρ = 1.1,γ = 1.1. Comparing the two
5The actual number of states, while ﬁnite, is diﬃcult to calculate. We know that each agent
has N possible states, since it can either report to one of the other (N − 1) agents or not belong,
i.e., it report to itself; the maximum possible states is then N
N. However, we impose on the model
that there not be any circular reporting — for example, we prohibit states where, either directly
or indirectly, agent i reports to j, who reports to i. This reduces the number of states from N
N.
6RePast 2.01 (repast.sourceforge.net), using the Java JRE 1.4.1 (www.java.sun.com) and Eclipse
2.1.0 (www.eclipse.org).
6Figure 2: N = 100,ρ = 1.1,γ = 0.0
Figure 3: N = 100,ρ = 1.1,γ = 1.1
7Figure 4: N = 100,ρ = 1.1,γ = 1.25
ﬁgures, increasing γ extends the branching of nodes or members out to the outer
edges of clusters. Still larger values of γ create suﬃcient incentives to prevent the
formation of one stable cluster. Figure 4 shows a set of multiple ﬂuctuating clusters
that resulted from N = 100,ρ = 1.1,γ = 1.25.
Generally, for γ = 0 (egalitarian allocation) no defection occurs and clusters sim-
ply grow to eventually form a single giant cluster. Total system synergy S increases
monotonically and the number of clusters decreases monotonically (Figure 2). As
γ increases, defection begins to occur. When a cluster splits through defection, S
decreases and the number of clusters increases (Figure 3). For γ ≤ 1.0 and N ≤ 50,
the system always forms a single cluster. However, for γ ≥ 1.25 and arbitrarily
large N, the system does not evolve to a single cluster (at least for the time periods
considered in our simulations) but rather reduces its state space to what may be
a set of stochastically oscillating states (Figure 4). Interestingly, for some combi-
nations of {γ,N}, the system does occasionally reach the maximized, single cluster
conﬁguration, only to fragment at a later time.
3.2 Eﬀects of N on Long-Term Asymptotic Behavior
The number of nodes N aﬀects the average cluster size C and thus the maximum
synergy the system can attain. Figure 5 shows the relation between N and average
cluster size, while Figure 6 shows the relation between N and maximum attained
synergy, expressed as S/Smax. Looking at the two ﬁgures, for γ ≤ 1.0, the system
converges to a stable giant cluster. For γ = 2.0 and N = 6, the system stabilized to
3 clusters of 2 with S/Smax = 0.6. For N ≥ 6, the system ﬂuctuates stochastically
between system states. For 1.0 < γ ≤ 2.0 there is a behavioral transition to multiple
ﬂuctuating clusters as N increases.
The transition between single-cluster states and ﬂuctuating states appears to
8Figure 5: Average Size of Cluster as a Function of N and γ (ρ = 1.1)
be sharp for γ > 1.25, and decreases with increasing gamma. For γ = 1.25, the
transition zone is elongated and takes place for 30 ≤ N ≤ 44. This blurring could
be due to the limited simulation period (i.e., for simulations where N < 44, stable
giant clusters may have been found for longer simulation periods; we are currently
running longer simulations within this region in an attempt to resolve this issue).
The increase in the transition value for N for decreasing γ suggests that with
large enough N, simulations with γ < 1.25 will also undergo a transition to the
stochastically ﬂuctuating regime. This hypothesis was considered for γ = 1.0 with
a second set of simulations that extended N up to 600 in increments of 100. Results
clearly showed the ﬂuctuating regime for N of 400 and above. Additional longer
simulations are needed to better deﬁne this transition zone.
To consider behavior for large N, we plot average cluster size C vs γ in Figure
7 for N = {50,400} and see that to a ﬁrst approximation, C is independent of
N within the ﬂuctuating regime. Let us now assume that systems for γ > 0 will
eventually transition into the ﬂuctuating regime for N large enough. For γ = 0.0
and N → ∞, an inﬁnite cluster will form. With this constraint, we ﬁt a power
law to the data as shown in the ﬁgure. If our assumptions are correct, this relation
predicts the average cluster for asymptotically large populations. Populations that
are smaller than this cluster size will be constrained to yield a single cluster while
those suﬃciently above will fall in the ﬂuctuating regime.
Finally, we note that this prediction of C also allows prediction of S/Smax
through a simple product of S calculated for the C and the number of such clusters
for the given N. With this simple calculation, the slowly downward trend in S/Smax
for a given gamma is explained (Figure 6).
9Figure 6: Ratio S/Smax as a Function of N and γ (ρ = 1.1)
Figure 7: Average Size of Cluster as a Function of γ (N = 100,ρ = 1.1)
104 Conclusions
The system displays a number of useful characteristics associated with Markov-
process networks. At the start of simulations, the set of agents, with vary large
number of possible set of state conﬁgurations, converges rapidly to a smaller set of
irreducible states. This smaller set may be one state (i.e., a single stable cluster)
or a subset of all possible states, each with a ﬁxed probability of transition to the
other states in the irreducible set. In this sense, while not being a single stable
system, it is likely a stochastically stable equilibria, where the system as evolved to a
smaller, irreducible set of states that oscillate stochastically. Within the small range
of potential parameters for {N,ρ,γ}, we were able to create a range of single-cluster
and what appear to be asymptotically stable clusters.
Our hierarchical synergistic network exhibits some of the fundamental behaviors
of self-organized critical systems. From a set of unorganized individual nodes or
agents, simple rules of interaction create structured, often stable single-cluster con-
ﬁgurations that maximize overall system performance. Other times — through the
random interaction of agents within these clusters — dramatic changes in cluster
and system structure occur. Still other systems display oscillating cluster structure
as agents act on the beneﬁts of defecting from current clusters and joining others.
Compared with other social interaction models, our model has a number of
limitations that deserve further exploration. First, when an agent considers de-
fection, adding new agents, and joining another cluster, it has perfect information
about expected current-period information, but no information about future earn-
ings. Additionally, agents do not adapt their strategies based on past actions, using
for example an agent-level reinforcement process. Second, a stable cluster or system
of stochastically stable clusters may change dramatically if there are minor stochas-
tic disturbances in ρ, γ, or even N. Since these system perturbations may cause
dramatic changes in system structure and synergy, additional simulations should
be conducted. Finally, while analysis of the data indicates that systems that cre-
ate more than one cluster exhibit the properties of asymptotic stability, more work
needs to be done on the characteristics of this stability. However, our simulations
indicate that even without such enhancements, networks can grow and evolve in
interesting new ways.
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